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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
EARL A. JOHNSON, dba Albeth Company, and BETH JOHNSON, his
wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
13509

ROCKING V HORSE TRAILERS,
INC., and ANN F. OLSEN,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the plaintiffs to quiet title to
certain real property located in Utah County, State of
Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On the 16th day of October, 1973, the District Court
of the Fourth Judicial District, the Honorable George
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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E. Ballif, District Judge, granted plaintiffs' motion for
Summary Judgment, quieting title to the subject real
estate to the plaintiffs, and denying the defendants' and
appellants' motion for Summary Judgment. Said decision
being made on the basis that the defendant, Ann F.
Olsen, had no interest in the subject real property, and
that tender of payment under a Uniform Real Estate
Contract was insufficient as a matter of law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek reversal of the trial court's ruling
on the plaintiffs' motion for Summary Judgment; and
seeks a remand of the matter to the District Court for
enforcement of a Uniform Real Estate Contract and determination of the amounts due and owing to complete
payment of said contract in full.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The subject action is concerned with the equitable
and record ownership and chain of title to real property
located in Utah County, State of Utah, which are as follows:
On November 10,1966, Lamar C. Clark and Georgina
Clark, his wife, were record owners on the subject real
estate. On said date they entered into a Uniform Real
Estate Contract, wherein it was proposed that upon payment in full by the Buyers, that the Clarks would transfer
their interest in subject property to the named buyer,
who was Rocking ' 0 ' Horse Trailers, Incorporated; said
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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corporation being a defendant in the instant action (R.
64, 65,108). The corporation made the monthly payments
required by the contract, through and including September 1, 1968 (R. 108). On January 30, 1967, Rocking ' 0 '
Horse Trailers filed a petition in bankruptcy, which petition set forth as an asset of the bankrupt the equitable
interest in the subject real property as provided by the
Uniform Real Estate Contract. On the 3rd day of June,
1968, the bankruptcy court entered an Order of Disclaimer regarding the subject premises, and the trustee
in bankruptcy was relieved from any further responsibilities pertaining to the subject property (R. 80, 109). On
the 12th of November, 1968, the Internal Revenue Service, a lien creditor of Rocking *0' Horse Trailers, Incorporated, offered the subject property for sale by sealed
bid (R. 66, 109). Plaintiffs tendered a bid to the Internal
Revenue Service pursuant to such offering in the sum of
$8,009.00, which was the high bid and which was accepted
by the Internal Revenue Service (R. 109). Following the
acceptance of said bid the Internal Revenue Service obtained an Order of Eviction, and caused the United States
Marshall to forcibly evict Rocking 'O' Horse Trailers
from occupancy of the premises (R. 59, 1,10). Following
the eviction, the plaintiffs then went into occupancy of
the premises. However, shortly thereafter the Internal
Revenue Service determined to cancel the sale of the subject premises to the plaintiffs herein, and the bid of the
plaintiffs was cancelled and their payment refunded (R.
66 (Exhibit "E"), 110). This was done without notice
to Rocking 'O' Horse Trailers, Incorporated. Thereafter
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4
the plaintiffs purchased from the record owners, the
Clarks, their interest in the property; this purchase was
by way of Quitclaim Deed and an Assignment on the
Uniform Real Estate Contract between the Clarks and
Rocking ' 0 ' Horse Trailers, and was for the sum of
$1,500.00 (R. 107). On December 17, 1969 the corporation discovered that the Internal Revenue Service had
not completed the sale of the property to the plaintiffs.
The Internal Revenue Service then released its lien in the
property and the corporation, for valuable consideration,
assigned all of its right, title and interest in and to the
subject premises by reason of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract to Ann F. Olsen (R. 67, 69, 108). Thereafter,
Ann F. Olsen, through her attorney and representatives,
had contact with the plaintiffs and their attorney for
the purpose of resolving the ownership of the property
and the resolution of the equitable interest of the parties
therein (R. 110). On January 22, 1973 the plaintiffs
without prior notice of termination of the Uniform Real
Estate Contract (R. 109) filed a complaint to quiet title
in the matter. Following the filing of the legal action,
defendant, Ann F. Olsen, as assignee of Rocking 'O' Horse
Trailers, tendered to the plaintiffs by personal check, the
entire balance due and owing according to her calculations, as shown upon the face of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract (R. 109). The check was tendered upon the
condition that it would be presented to First Security
Bank of Utah, Nephi Office, for payment and that said
bank would pay said check upon presentation of the
check, accompanied by the Warranty Deed and the Title
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
Insurance specified in the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
This check has never been returned, but has not been
negotiated (R. 109). Some pertinent facts regarding
the legal proceedings are as follows:
Ann F. Olsen filed an answer in behalf of herself and
as assignee of Rocking ' 0 ' Horse Trailers, Incorporated.
After the filing of such answer, plaintiffs moved ex-party
and without notice to counsel of Ann F. Olsen, for the
default judgment against Rocking *0' Horse Trailers, Incorporated; that default judgment was granted. Thereafter, while said default judgment was in effect, hearing
upon the motions for Summary Judgment was had, and
as a result of those hearings the Court entered the judgment which is appealed from. Following the entry of
that judgment, Ann F. Olsen filed her motion to vacate
the default judgment against the corporation. That motion was granted (R. 105). In addition the plaintiffs filed
a motion to amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law. That Motion was granted, and Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were prepared and
are filed herein (R. 106). The Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment upon the basis that
the corporation had no right, title or interest in the subject property on the date of assignment to Ann F. Olsen
for the reason that the interest of the corporation in the
subject premises had been vested in the bankruptcy trustee on the filing of the corporation's petition in bankruptcy. The Court further found that the payment tendered by Ann F. Olsen to the plaintiffs herein, by way
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of her personal check was insufficient in law, however
no determination of the amount due under the contract
was made; and the appellants stood before the court prepared to pay such amount as was determined by the
court (R. 115-116).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE
PLAINTIFFS HEREIN AND HOLDING
THAT THE ASSIGNMENT FROM ROCKING '0' HORSE TRAILERS, INCORPORATED TO ANN F. OLSEN WAS WITHOUT
EFFECT BY REASON OF THE VESTING
THE TITLE OF THE EQUITABLE INTEREST OF ROCKING 'O' HORSE TRAILERS,
IN THE TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY.
The appellants premise this argument upon the bankruptcy law and upon the real property law of the state
of Utah.
As to the bankruptcy procedure, when Rocking '0'
Horse Trailers filed its petition for bankruptcy, title to
the subject property vested in the trustee in bankruptcy.
11 U. S. C. A. Section 110. Because the property was encumbered with a federal tax lien, the trustee was unable
to sell or manage the property for the benefit of the creditors. The trustee therefore petititoned the bankruptcy
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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court for an Order of Abandonment (R. 80), which petition was granted (R. 83). The effect of an Order of
Abandonment or disclaimer, is to relieve the trustee from
further duties as to such property, and to re-vest title
to the subject property in the bankrupt. Brookhaven
Bank & Trust Co. v. Gwin, 253 F. 2d 17 (5th Cir. 1958) ;
In Re AldricKs Estate, 215 P. 2d 724, 35 C. 2d 20 (1950);
9 Am. Jur. 2d 706, Bankruptcy Section 943. The vesting
of title by reason of bankruptcy proceedings is a matter
of the bankruptcy law, and does not occur by document
entered in the County records where the chain of title is
recorded. Re-vesting upon an abandonment or disclaimer,
re-vests the title and relates back to the date of the filing
of the petition of bankruptcy. And the title of the bankrupt continues as if the bankruptcy petition had not
been filed or had not occurred. Brown v. O'Keefe, 300
U. S. 598, 57 S. Ct. 924 (1937); Helvey v. U. S. Building
& Loan Ass'n of Los Angeles, 184 P. 2d 919, 81 C. A. 2d
647 (1947). Therefore in the instant matter, on the date
Rocking 'O' Horse Trailers filed its petition in bankruptcy, its equitable interest in the real property vested
in its trustee in bankruptcy. The equitable interest in
real property arises from the Uniform Real Estate Contract, with the record owner retaining bare legal title as
a security interest in the property, subject to payment
in full by the purchasers. In Re Estate of Willson, 28 U.
2d 197, 499 P. 2d 1298 (1972). Therefore, the equitable
interest held by Rocking 'O' Horse Trailers, under the
Uniform Real Estate Contract, did upon the filing of the
petition of bankruptcy vest in the trustee in the bankDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ruptcy. However, when the trustee in bankruptcy secured the Order of Abandonment from the bankruptcy
judge, title re-vested the equitable interest of Rocking
' 0 ' Horse Trailers in that corporation, subject to the
record lien encumbrances; especially the lien of the Internal Revenue Service. The Internal Revenue Service
then proceeded to execute upon their lien. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue acts pursuant to the collection process in the capacity of a lienor, as distinguished
from the owner, and legal and equitable title never did
vest in the Internal Revenue Service, U. S. v. Sulliven,
333 F. 2d 100 (3d Cir. 1964), but merely passed from the
corporation to the trustee in bankruptcy, and back to the
corporation. Although, the Internal Revenue Service
proceeded with a duly authorized sale of the property,
at the normal conclusion of which the title would by reason of legal document and law, be vested in the purchaser
of such sale; in this matter such title transfer and vesting
never did occur by reason of the Internal Revenue Service
abandoning their sale procedure, and no claim is made
by reason of the Internal Revenue Service sale. The
plaintiffs herein claim right to the subject property by
virtue of possession, quitclaim deed, and an assignment
of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. Possession was
acquired through the Internal Revenue Service's use of
forcible eviction of the Rocking ' 0 ' Horse Trailer corporation. There was no abandonment of the premises by
the corporation. Plaintiffs herein had knowledge and notice of the existence of the Uniform Real Estate Contract,
by reason of their assignment of the same. Knowledge
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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9
of these facts is also readily evident by reason of the
great disparity in the purchase price considered by the
plaintiffs; $8,000.00 bid to the Internal Revenue Service,
$1,500.00 paid for the assignment of Uniform Real Estate
Contract, and the Quitclaim Deed. Assignment under
the Uniform Real Estate Contract placed the plaintiffs
in the exact same position as the Clarks under the Uniform Real Estate Contract; that is, as holding bare legal
title as a security interest subject to the payment in full
by the corporation, or in this case, by the lawful assignee
of the corporation, Ann F. Olsen. Therefore, we find the
equitable chain of title going from Lamar C. and Georgina
Clark, by reason of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, to
Rocking ' 0 ' Horse Trailers, Incorporated, then passing
from Rocking ' 0 ' Horse Trailers, Incorporated, to the
trustee in bankruptcy by reason of the bankruptcy petition; thereafter title passed from the trustee in bankruptcy back to the Rocking 'O' Horse Trailers, Incorporated by reason of the Order of Abandonment. Thereafter,
the equitable title passed from Rocking 'O' Horse Trailers, Incorporated to Ann F. Olsen by reason of the assignment. Therefore, as the parties appeared before the trial
court, for hearing upon the motion for summary judgment, Ann F. Olsen had the equitable interest in the subject property, by reason of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, and the plaintiffs had record ownership by reason
of the Quitclaim Deed and Assignment of Contract.
Prior to the hearing upon the Motion of Summary
Judgment, Ann F. Olsen had tendered to the plaintiffs,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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her check drawn on First Security Bank of Utah, Nephi
Office, in a sum representing the full balance owing under
the Uniform Real Estate Contract. Ann F. Olsen instructed the plaintiffs that said check was to be presented
to First Security Bank of Utah, Nephi Office, and at
the time of presentation for payment, the plaintiffs were
to deliver the Warranty Deed and Title Insurance called
for in the Uniform Real Estate Contract; the bank would
upon such presentation, pay the check in full. The Uniform Real Estate Contract provided that upon payment
in full, the Warranty Deed, together with the title insurance would be delivered to the purchasers. The purchasers, evidencing their willingness to pay simultaneous
with such delivery, or within minutes before such delivery,
and requiring that the Seller be prepared to deliver the
Warranty Deed and the Title Insurance at the time of
payment in full. Requesting the Seller to deliver the deed
and title insurance is not an unreasonable requirement
and does not vitiate the tender of payment. These are
not conditions, such as would make the tender of payment a conditional tender outside the scope of the contract between the parties and insufficient in law. 55
Am. Jur. 770, Vendor Purchaser Section 342; 52 Am. Jur.
231, Tender Section 24. Furthermore, as Ann F. Olsen
appeared before the Court with her legal counsel, the
question of the amount owed under the contract was submitted for the Court's determination, together with a
commitment to pay such amount. It was therefore a
manifest abuse of justice for the Court to terminate the
rights of Ann F. Olsen to pay the full amount due and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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owing under the contract; and receive and return a deed
to the property, plus the title insurance provided by the
Uniform Real Estate Contract; and it was a manifest
error of the Court to rule as a matter of law, that the title
to the subject property remained in the trustee in bankruptcy.
Following the logical line of the Court's decision, it
would indicate that title to the subject real estate would
still be vested subject to the Uniform Real Estate Contract, in the trustee in bankruptcy of Rocking ' 0 ' Horse
Trailers, Incorporated. Furthermore, if title to the real
property is vested in that trustee, it would appear unwise
for the Court to enter an Order Quieting Title to the
property in the plaintiffs herein. However, this is not
the case, the Court was in error in its determination, for
equitable title had revested in the corporation upon the
date of the disclaimer, and if not then, on the date of the
discharge of the bankrupt, 8 B. C. J. S. 166, Bankruptcy
Section 591; Stipe v. Jefferson, 257 N. W. 99, (Minn.
1934), which occurred on the 23rd day of October, 1969,
approximately 2 months prior to the transfer to Ann F.
F. Olsen. Therefore, based upon the record chain of title,
the existing valid contracts between the parties, and the
events that had transpired, including the bankruptcy proceedings, and the Internal Revenue Service eviction and
abortive sale, when the plaintiff and Ann F. Olsen appeared before the District Court on the 21st day of September, 1973, record title to the subject property was
vested in the plaintiffs, subject to the rights of Ann F.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Olsen, which rights were defined by the Uniform Real
Estate Contract. Since Ann F. Olsen was then willing to
pay the balance due under that contract and had previously tendered full payment on the contract, it was then
encumbent upon the District Judge to determine that
amount, and order the plaintiffs to deliver a warranty
deed and title insurance immediately following the receipt of such amount due. The Court's failure to enter
such an Order was a mistake in law, and must be corrected upon this appeal by reversing the judgment of the
trial court.
CONCLUSION
In the conclusion, the appellants request the Court
to reverse the decision of the trial court, and to remand
the matter with instructions that the defendant, Ann. F.
Olsen, is entitled to judgment of the trial court, ruling
that the Uniform Real Estate Contract of which she is an
assignee, is a valid and enforceable document; that the
trial court should receive evidence to determine the
amount which is due and owing under said Unifomi Real
Estate Contract, and then enter its Order requiring the
plaintiffs to deliver its Warranty Deed and Title Insurance to Ann F. Olsen, upon her prior payment in full of
the sum owing.
Respectfully submitted,
MILTON T. HARMON
53 North Main Street
Nephi, Utah 84648
Attorney for Appellants
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